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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS


Week Ending 4 March 1972

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Top Secret

NSA review completed

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



Enemy Activity

Enemy military activity in South Vietnam continued at a low level during the past week. For the near future there will probably be little change in Military Regions (MR) 3 and 4, where the enemy does not appear to be making preparations for a new upsurge of activity. There are increasing signs that the enemy's mid-February offensive plans were thrown out of train by the aggressive and intensive spoiling activities of friendly air and ground forces. Nonetheless, the enemy continues his preparations for major offensive action in northern MR 1 and the western highlands of MR 2, and he is probably now in a position to launch fairly large attacks in these areas. The precise scale and timing of these attacks are still uncertain, and will be heavily influenced by continuing Allied preemptive actions.

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In Laos, the government's diversionary operation east and southeast of the Plaine des Jarres has ground to a halt in the face of strong North Vietnamese Army (NVA) resistance. All but the forward elements of the 5,000-man friendly force have now pulled back to areas near their starting point. There is general agreement that the friendly campaign accomplished its major objective of relieving the pressure on Long Tieng, since enemy commanders felt compelled to shift a significant portion of their forces from the immediate Long Tieng area to counter the thrust. Moreover, the enemy's timetable for this dry season was set back--probably by about a month--as a result of Vang Pao's initiative. Elsewhere in Laos there was a slight increase in enemy activity, but no major actions occurred.

Communist forces in Cambodia during the week launched several sharp ground and shelling attacks against Cambodian Army (FANK) units in the Siem Reap area. This fighting has dealt Cambodia its heaviest losses since the CHENLA II operation; it may lead to a lessening of the government's interest in pursuing the campaign to isolate the Communist forces in Angkor Wat. The NVA and Viet Cong main force units in Cambodia continue to move closer to the border of South Vietnam's MR 3, but there are as yet no firm indications of their intent. The continued massing of troops in the border area should, however, provide lucrative targets for further Allied air strikes.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

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The acceptance of an additional 4,120 NVA personnel this week brings the estimate of infiltrators into Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 to a total of 93,400-95,400.

a call for a general transportation offensive to begin on 1 March has been issued by the main North Viet-

sive to begin on 1 March has been issued by the main North Vietnamese headquarters responsible for logistics operations in the Lao Panhandle. The stated duration of the "general offensive" is for the month of March, but its execution may continue well into April.

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